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ETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN SOUTH AFRICAN PLANNING 
The legitimacy of planning as a 
socially responsive and professionally 
responsible discipline will, in the future 
South Africa, be assessed with referen­
ces to the ethical or moral principles to 
which it adheres. The moral attitude 
INTRODUCTION 
The scope and nature of the planners 
work has perhaps most frequently 
been perceived in terms of plans: 
master plans, development plans, 
structure plans, guide plans and the 
like. This perception is of course 
simplistic and incomplete, but is never­
theless useful as a lay guide to the 
planners' professional territory; as an 
indicator to the public of what the 
planner plans. An issue of greater 
significance to the planning discipline 
itself goes beyond the question of what 
the planners plans; it is the question 
posed forty years ago by Karl Mann­
heim, who asked "Who plans the plan­
ner?" (Western 1972:,209). What 
�annheim meant by this; slightly cryp-
/tic question was, what aFe the influen­
ces and assumptions t�at guide the 
planner in his work? ot more perti-
nently, what are the mor,al and ethical 
values that give legitimacy and defensi­
bility to the planners work, and credi­
bility to the planner him�elf. 
While this subject has to date been ac­
corded limited attention in South 
Africa, it has for some years enjoyed 
fairly extensive study in planning 
circles abroad. It is twelve years since 
Kaufman expressed the view that, in 
the United States, "ethics is in nowa­
day" (Hendler 1990:2) and since then, 
he and a number of other theorists 
have deliberated on the moral premises 
and problems of planning. In their 
familiar paper on the ethics of contem­
porary American planners, Howe and 
Kaufman ( 1979) pose questions relat­
ing to the morality of procedural 
intervention in pursuance of political 
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pertaining in the profession in the past, 
notably in respect of the support of 
discriminatory racial practices, will not 
be tenable. A new ethical culture must 
thus be established. To this end, the 
ethical premises of planning abroad 
interests and conclude - on the basis of 
a survey of members of the American 
Institute of Planners - that planners 
( operating in the late l 970's) prefer 
politically neutral, technically-oriented 
roles. Commenting a decade later, 
Baum (1988:294) says the "problem 
with which this position leaves plan­
ners is that, insofar as the poor and 
racial minorities believe that they have 
been poorly represented in planning 
decisions. Such efforts at neutrality 
may not satisfy them or persuade them 
that public planning "works" for them. 
By retreating from the ethnic, racial, 
and economic conflicts which explicit 
advocacy would evoke, planners do 
not avoid these conflicts or contain the 
conceptual crises but only intensify 
them". 
Klosterman ( 1978, 1983) entered the 
ethical arena in his analysis of the 
normative foundations of planning 
and the fact/value dichotomy in plan­
ning, and Bolan ( 1983) addressed such 
moral issues as responsibility and 
obligation in his examination of the 
structure of ethical choice in planning 
practice. After developing a frame­
work of social influences under which 
the planner functions in making ethical 
decisions, Bolan concluded that ethical 
choice in planning practice is derived 
less from the established norms of the 
past than from a continuous search for 
new values germane to new situations. 
In discussing future situations with 
reference to forecasting, Wachs ( 1985) 
presented the view that while planners 
may feel protected by using the argu­
ment of objectivity, the major determi-
and the precepts of moral philosophy 
are examined - and posited as points 
of reference for the profession in the 
process of ethical re-orientation that it 
must undertake. 
nants of forecasting are in fact the 
assumptions and demands of interest 
groups or public officials. Thus the 
problem of forecasting for planning 
purposes has distinct ethical, as well as 
technical, dimensions. Indeed, recog­
nition of the pervasiveness of ethics in 
all aspects of the planning process was 
personified by Kaufman (1987 113): 
" ... ethics is inextricably intertwined 
into the marrow of planning practice". 
Planner's moral values must accord­
ingly apply to both the ends and means 
pertaining to any project. Faludi 
( 1989:61 / 62) drew on Singer's concep­
tion of practical ethics in putting the 
opinion that ethics " ... concerns the 
ends of our actions ... it is still results, 
not motives, that really matter" and 
that for " ... planning to be ethically 
motivated ... it must analyse the 
effects of proposed action, not only on 
the planning subject, but also on 
others". 
While it is this last point - the effect of 
planners' action on others - that is of 
central concern in this paper, the 
foregoing brief review of some of the 
well-known articles on planning ethics 
over th� last decade may perhaps serve 
to illustrate the diversity and depth of 
the topic. The authors of the articles 
do not attempt to dictate the exact 
nature of ethical behaviour, but offer 
rather a range of moral responses to a 
diverse set of conditions. This brings 
the question of the South African 
planner's response to local socio­
political conditions, viewed from an 
ethical perspective, to the fore as a 
topic now warranting the attention of 
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the discipline. 
Inasmuch as the political/ ethical edi­
fice before which we now stand in the 
Republic has been built up over the 
years with purpose and deliberation, it 
is sensible to glance backward before 
looking - from our present position -
into the future. It is also, I believe, 
proper to define one's terms; to dis­
close my interpretation and under­
standing of the field of ethics, before 
applying the fruits of that field to the 
South African situation. 
THE CONCEPT OF ETHICS 
Inasmuch as ethics is primarily con­
cerned with human conduct, it - like 
human conduct - can be viewed or 
studied in various ways. It may be 
observed and described in a behav­
ioral, psychological, biological, an­
thropological or sociological sense, but 
such studies, while contributing to an 
understanding of ethics, do not deal 
with the cardinal problem attaching to 
the field of ethics. This problem re­
volves not around facts which such 
studies yield, but about values. "This is 
usually expressed by saying that ethics. 
is not a positive science but a norma­
tive science - it is not primarily occu­
pied with the actual character of hu­
man conduct but with its ideal, not so 
much with what human conduct is as 
what it ought to be" (Encyclopedia 
Brittanica Vo! 14:757). Ethical issues 
are thus moral issues, and moral philo­
sophy (which is frequently taken as 
synonymous with ethics) is, as Raphael 
( 1984:8) tells us, "philosophical en­
quiry about norms or values, about 
ideas of right and wrong, good and 
bad, what should and what should not 
be done". In similar vein, Hendler 
( 1990:22) sees ethical matters as "issues 
which entail moral agents (e.g. per­
sons) and questions of the goodness or 
rightness of their behaviour". 
Popkin and Stroll (1989:1) move closer 
to the professional field by referring to 
ethics as "a code or set of principles by 
which people live"; the content of the 
Hippocratic oath of the medical pro­
fession being an example. That oath 
has utility here as an illustration of the 
dichotomy that is present in profes­
sional ethics, inasmuch as it (the oath) 
relates to a code of ethics - rather than 
a code of conduct. The latter is essen­
tially concerned with conventions per-
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tammg to practical everyday behav­
iour, with pragmatic guidelines for 
professionals (Hendler 1990). A code 
of ethics is broader: it gives intellectual 
and moral substance to the profession; 
it posits a set of values (predominantly 
social) which give legitimacy to the 
actions of the profession. While it is 
this wider ethical convention that is of 
interest to me, the importance of codes 
of conduct - more particularly where 
they are derivative of fundamental 
moral commitments - is of course ac­
knowledged. 
To the extent that the planning disci­
pline is, above all, judgmental and 
advisory, it is awash with ethical issues 
in both the fields of planning practice 
and planning theory. It is confronted 
with conflict and choice, with inten­
tions and consequences, with uncer­
tainties and commitments. In writing 
about ethics in planning, Wachs ( 1985) 
suggests that planning may be subject 
to ethical analysis in four areas. The 
planner's day to day behaviour is the 
first; planning techniques is the second; 
the moral element attaching to plans 
and policies is the third, and the fourth 
is administrative discretion. This is a 
good list but could, in my view, be 
strengthened by explicit consideration 
of the planner's role, and - most 
significantly :_ the moral philosophy 
that moulds and gives form to the 
planner's role. Investigation of this 
would expose the normative beliefs, 
the values, the perceived obligations, 
that underpin the planner's conscience 
and his work. It would for example, 
show how "planning in the public 
interest" in South Africa has been 
congruent with social welfare, social 
freedom and social justice - or has not 
been. Before examining the ethical 
base of South African planning, it is 
necessary to review some aspects of 
moral philosophy in order to construct 
a frame of reference for that exami­
nation. 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
Moral philosophy cannot and does not 
attempt to set out what we ought to do 
in any given circumstance. That we 
must determine for ourselves. Philo­
sophy does however provide a range of 
possible theories among which the 
individual must decide which, if any, 
to accept. This is perhaps indirectly 
reflected in Plato's attitude to justice -
one of the few cardinal moral virtues 
(wisdom, courage, discipline and jus­
tice) - in which context he says that 
"the real concern of justice is not with 
external actions but with a man's 
inward self' (In Vesey 1986:27). Plato 
contends that it is an individual's 
knowledge of that which constitutes 
"the good", that causes the individual 
to act in a moral fashion. He argues 
that if one acquires knowledge through 
a lengthy period of intellectual school­
ing, one must develop virtuous habits 
of behaviour and be capable of under­
standing the nature of the good life. A 
person with that understanding would 
not act evilly. 
Aristotle commences his treatise on 
Nicomachean Ethics with the state­
ment that "all human activities aim at 
some good". While the character or 
nature of the good varies with the 
objective of a particular activity, Aris­
totle holds that there is a "chief good" 
which over-arches all others and is 
universal: happiness. We choose happ­
iness, says Aristotle, "always for itself 
and never for the sake of something 
else, but honour, pleasure, reason and 
every virtue we choose indeed for 
themselves . . . but we choose them 
also for the sake of happiness, judging 
that by means of them we shall be 
happy". (Kaplan 1970: 168). The ques­
tion as to how we should behave in 
order to achieve happiness is thus 
raised and the Aristotlean response is 
found in the "doctrine of the mean"; 
the "golden mean". This, in a nutshell, 
holds that the proper way to behave in 
the moral sphere is in accordance with 
the mean - in accordance with the 
precept of moderation. "For example, 
in order to be happy, one must be 
courageous, liberal, proud, witty, 
modest and so on. But all of these 
"virtues", as Aristotle designates them, 
are virtues of moderation: courage is 
the mean between cowardice and rash­
ness; liberality between prodigality and 
frugality; pride between vanity and 
humility, and so forth. Aristotle's 
philosophy of the "golden mean" can 
be condensed as follows: In order to 
achieve happiness, people must act 
moderately, they must act so as to be 
striving for the mean between two 
extremes" (Popkin and Stroll 1980: l 0). 
Epicurus had, it appears, no misgiv­
ings about extremes since his moral 
philosophy of Hedonism held that 
people pursue pleasure, and pleasure 
exclusively, in their lives. The acquisi­
tion of pleasure and avoidance of pain 
is thus the human raison d'etre. Ethical 
hedonism accordingly holds that peo­
ple seek pleasure and should do so 
since pleasure constitutes the only 
good. The converse philosophy - cyni­
cism - subscribes to the view that the 
salvation of society will be found only 
in ascetic living. Since the cynics 
perceived the world as fundamentally 
evil, it was - in order to live properly -
necessary to withdraw from involve­
ment in it. This is of course essentially 
an anti-social individualistic doctrine, 
and as such has little of import to 
planning. 
The same comment is applicable to the 
philosophy of stoicism which domi­
nated Roman thought in the post­
Alexandran period until the advent of 
Christianity. The stoics strove to be 
indifferent to external influences - to 
be independent of the world - and so 
to be free of desires and passions. This 
can be construed as being in conflict 
with their metaphysical belief in pre­
destination which deems all happen­
ings to be arranged by God according 
to some preconceived plan. This stance 
is consistent with the philosophy of 
Spinoza, one of the heroic figures in 
the history of ethics, his renowned 
work, The Ethics, published in the 
mid-seventeenth century and, accord­
ing to Bertrand Russel (1989:200) "a 
mc}sterpiece of concise a�d lucid dis­
course", postulates through deductive 
logic that God and the uhiverse, God 
I and nature, are synonym,;ms. Thus all 
events are predetermined: and happi­
ness resides in acceptance of this and 
the consequential fact t�at there are 
limits to human power. It is accord­
ingly senseless to struggle against 
predestined events. Freedom of moral 
choice and action is therefore bound­
ed. 
The utilitarian philosophy of Bentham 
and John Stuart Mill attempted to set 
out a primary principle on which basis 
an action could be deemed right or 
wrong. This was, and is, the principle 
of utility which states that an action is 
right - is morally defensible - insofar 
as it promotes the greatest happiness 
for the greatest number. It is important 
to note that utilitarian philosophy 
places emphasis on the effect of action; 
on the consequences of a particular ac-
tion. The rightness or otherwise of an 
action is determined through an analy­
sis of consequences and not a consider­
ation of the motive which occasioned 
the action. As Faludi ( 1986) has 
shown, consequentialism is germane to 
planning, as indeed is the issue of 
motive or intentionality (Haynes and 
Stubbings 1987). 
It is interesting to note that Bentham's 
contention that the sum of human 
happiness created by an action was 
measurable without discrimination 
across all of society, was vehemently 
opposed by Nietzsche. He believed 
unequivocally that certain people were 
inherently more important than others 
and that their happiness or unhappi­
ness was of greater import than that of 
the average person. He berated Mill 
for presuming to suggest that "what is 
right for one man is right for another". 
Immanuel Kant's intellectual stance in 
relation to utilitarianism was less ag­
gressive than Nietzsche's and, I think, 
rather more sensible. Kant is at vari­
ance with utilitarian philosophy in em­
phasizing that the essential feature of 
morality resides in the motive which 
gives rise to an action. The moral 
worth of an action must be assessed 
with reference to its motive. This is 
helpful in the assessment of past plan­
ning activities in this country which 
will follow shortly - as is Kant's cate­
gorical or ethical imperative which 
Raphael ( 1984:55 / 56) describes in his 
book on Moral Philosophy: "Kant 
gave three formulations of the categor­
ical imperative i.e. of the fundamental 
principle of moral action ... The first 
concerns the form of the categorical 
imperative; the second concerns its 
content; and the third links these to­
gether. 
(I) Act as if you were legislating for
everyone.
(2) Act so as to treat human beings as
ends and never merely as means.
(3) Act as if you were a member of a
realm of ends."
The first of the imperatives lays stress 
on moral impartiality; the second 
requires that you act towards another 
and his purposes as you naturally do 
towards your own; the third says that 
you should act as a member of a 
community of persons, all of whom are 
entitled to make moral decisions. "It
implies a form of equality for all men" 
(Raphael 1984:57) and in so doing 
shows that Kantian ethics is in fact an 
ethics of democracy. A person has a 
duty to uphold the tenets of democracy 
and, in Kant's perception, a person is 
moral when he acts from a sense of 
duty. 
The foregoing "classical" ethical theor­
ies provide an array of referential 
constructs: the good, the good life, 
happiness, the golden mean of moder­
ation, predetermination, motivism. 
Modern ethics is largely centred on the 
application of analysis to moral theory 
and consequently takes form in natu­
ralist, anti-naturalist, motivist, deonto­
logical, consequential and a number of 
other approaches. While these do not 
add appreciably to the ethical measur­
ing rods to be applied to South African 
planning, the work of two modern 
philosophers has more than passing 
significance. 
The first is the philosophy of Jean Paul 
Sartre as reflected in his Existentialism 
and Humanism. "Very briefly, Sartre's 
aim . . .  is to exhibit existentialism as 
an optimistic account of the human 
condition in the sense that each of us 
has the possibility of living a life worth 
living". (Baldwin, 1986:287). This 
means that such a life incorporates 
values that make it worth-while, and 
indeed Sartre asserts unambiguously 
that a correct understanding human 
life does inflict certain values upon a 
person. These are "honesty to oneself 
in one's own life, and sufficient respect 
for the freedom of others that they are 
able to live their lives as they choose, 
subject to the constraint on their part 
of similar respect for others" (Baldwin 
1986:290). This is in my judgement a 
simple yet strikingly incisive represen­
tation of moral behaviour and one 
which is apposite when addressing past 
societal-cum-political conventions in 
the Republic. 
Equally ,apposite in this regard is the 
philosophy of John Rawls which is set 
out in his Theory of Justice (1971). His 
concept of justice is in conflict with the 
utilitarian postulate of happiness of the 
greatest number. Rawlsian justice 
"denies that the loss of freedom for 
some is made right by a greater good 
shared by others. It does not allow that 
the sacrifices imposed on a few are 
outweighed by the larger sum of ad­
vantages enjoyed by many" (In Mc-
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Connell 1981:174). Indeed, Rawls 
proceeds further by giving priority to 
any equality concept of justice which 
holds, firstly, that each person is to 
have an equal right to equal basic 
liberties, and secondly (and saliently) 
that social and economic inequalities 
are to be arranged to the greater 
benefit of the least advantaged. No 
action that benefits only the privileged 
group and does nought to improve the 
situation of the deprived or disadvan­
taged is justified. This line of ethical 
thought is of course germane to an 
analysis of the long-standing system of 
distribution of benefits in South Africa 
- which cannot but lead this discussion
into a consideration of the situation,
past and present, of the black sector of
society, and of the conduct of the
planning profession in relation to that
sector.
THE ETHICAL ST AND ARD 
I have argued previously that the 
public interest principle - a corner­
stone of planning morality and method 
- has been inverted in South Africa by
the policy of apartheid which has
spawned a process in which planning
for the disadvantaged black majority
has been pursued on the basis of the
protection of the interest of the white
community (Muller 1983). In his work
on practical ethics, Singer indirectly
addresses this point by stating that
living or acting on the basis of some
interpretation of ethical standards
must be tied up with argumtmts justify­
ing the way one is acting. But, says
Singer, (1979:9 / 10) " ... the justifica­
tion must be of a certain kind. For
instance, a justification in terms of self­
interest alone would not do ... Self­
interested acts must be shown to be
compatible with more broadly based
ethical principles ... for the notion of
ethics carries within it the idea of
something bigger than the individual
... " Ethical judgements of actions are
thus made with reference to a point of
view that is universally accepted. One
might, on this basis, expect the "grea­
test happiness for the greatest number"
utilitarian thesis to enjoy credence in 
the ethical domain.
However, the practical problems att­
aching to utilitarianism raises ques­
tions about its general efficacy. Fran­
kena (1973), for example, suggests that 
an action may maximize the sum of 
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good in a particular context, while 
being unjust or inequitable in the 
manner in which the sum is distrib­
uted. This attitude is echoed by Taylor 
( 1980) who envisages situations in 
which a plan which offers overall 
maximum happiness to a population 
may yet impose unfair and hard costs 
on an underprivileged minority group. 
This leads to a stance that has been 
accorded increasing recognition as a 
tenable universal ethical principle: that 
justice is served by apportioning 
greater weight to the interests of disad­
vantaged groups. Miller (1985 in Fa­
Judi 1989:59) carries the dialectic to a 
logical conclusion in saying that " ... 
to do this, one has to introduce some 
ethical principle of equality as a 
"higher" value which says that it is 
morally good to favour the weak . : . ·
some would say that the adoption of 
some higher principle of equality is 
tantamount to admitting this as the 
guiding ethical principle in place of the 
utilitarian principle of maximizing 
happiness for the community as a 
whole". 
The approach adopted here accords 
with that of Miller - and indeed Rawls 
- from which it follows that questions
of justice and equality in relation to the
underprivileged black communities of
South Africa are pivotal in any debate
revolving around ethics. The moral
record of the planning profession in
this country will thus be assessed
against an ethical standard founded on 
the promotion of the interests of the
disadvantaged black majority. While it
might be argued that other measures of
ethical spirit could be applied to plan­
ning, I believe that the universality of
the above principle on the one hand
and the peculiarities of the discrimina­
tory South African social system on
the other, makes the investigatory
approach adopted here both defensible
and apt.
THE PLANNING HERITAGE 
In attempting to inquire into the future 
of planning, it is worth remembering -
and therefore worth repeating - that 
ours is a young profession still in a 
process of active evolution. It is accor­
dingly sensible to return briefly to the 
past since a backward look is necessary 
for a sense of perspective and for an 
estimate of the grip, good or bad, that 
the past still has on the present and 
may have in the years ahead. What 
follows is an idiosyncratic version of 
the evolutionary stages of South Afri­
can planning, derived from a selection 
of the profession's published works, 
with some interpretive comment on the 
ethical stance adopted at the various 
times. 
AGE OF ANTICIPATION 
Starting in 1919, the terms of the 
Public Health Act (Section 132 ( l)(h) ) 
enabled the Minister to make regula­
tions, confer powers and impose duties 
on local authorities in respect of plan­
ning, land subdivision, zoning and 
densities. This was also the year of the 
establishment of the Transvaal Town 
Planning Association, a pioneering 
body that sought, inter alia, to advance 
the study and knowledge of town 
planning; to foster the improvement of 
towns; to promote the elimination of 
slums; to procure changes in the law 
affecting town planning, and to stimu­
late interest in planning through the 
medium of lectures and conference 
papers. Happily, this last objective and 
activity has left us with a glimpse of the 
attitudes and activities of this country's 
early planners. 
A publication of the Association 
( 1931) includes an address delivered by 
its president, Charles Porter, in De­
cember 1922. Beyond an articulate 
interest in West European planning 
history, Porter appears preoccupied 
with roads - preferring a "spider's 
web" or radial system to the rectangu­
lar. He is critical of Johannesburg's 
road layout and of high residential 
densities - referring to the "sweating of 
the land" by an overcrowding of dwel­
ling units, "a sure embryo of future 
slums". He goes on to say that " .. , in 
future town planning in the Transvaal, 
the setting aside of areas suitable in 
nature and extent for the housing of 
natives and coloured persons, is a 
matter of very great importance, for 
the experience of Johannesburg has 
taught us that neglect to do so means, 
in our midst, those crowded native and 
coloured slums which are a menace 
and disgrace to South Af ri�n com­
munities". The solution to this stain on 
society is provided - as town planning 
principle - by Porter: "That effort be 
made to obtain legal powers . . . to 
secure some measure of effective con­
trol of the ingress of natives other than 
those coming to mining or other defi­
nite employments or to approved 
employment agencies" (Porter 1931:-
15/ 17). If one is able to put the mis­
guided foresight of this "planning 
principle" aside, the general tenor of 
Porter's address can be characterised 
as regulatory: the establishment of 
planning regulations to control urban 
development. 
Talking at the University of the Wit­
watersrand in May 1930 on the need 
for town planning, Furner carried the 
plea for planning control forward: "I 
must again emphasize the fact that a 
city plan is not a grandiose scheme for 
immediate and costly civic improve-
. ments. On the contrary, as opposed to 
the present planless and haphazard 
growth, squalor and extravagance, .a 
city plan would mean a well reasoned 
scheme, outlining an economic system 
of scientific, artistic and hygienic 
municipal reconstruction and develop­
ment, providing specially for the con­
servation of citizen life and natural 
resources, and the total abolition of 
slum conditions." (Furner 1931 :28). A 
year later, Pearse (1931: I) described 
town planning quite simply as" ... the 
planning of towns in an orderly man­
ner ·with due regard to the circulation 
of traffic, hygiene and amenities". 
This period of incipient professional­
ism, could, I think, be called the age of 
anticipation. It is a time c;haracterized 
by. a critical attitude to prevailing 
urban conditions and a slightly ingenu­
·ous belief that the solutidn and salva­
tion lay in planning. Thej ethical posi­
tion is difficult to define{ it could be
argued that there is a modicum of the
self-interested Platonic go;od life in the
planning approach, hut ;it is an ap­
proach lacking the essen
1
tial morality
that would make it ethically tenable.
This lacuna was to be addressed in
1938 by Roy Kantorowich in a paper
that appeared in one of the three
seminal editions of the South African
Architectural Record on town plan­
ning during that year.
In describing a "model native township
for 20 OOO inhabitants", Kantorowich
reviews the position of the black citizen
in the South African urban commun­
ity. The black man, says Kantorowich
(1938:346) " ... takes a peculiarly
unfortunate position in the economic
status of our society traceable to the
existence of a colour bar . . . When 
employed in the early stages of devel­
opment of this country, he was put on 
to the most unskilled work. This im­
mediately brought _about the view that 
the Native was (QED) inferior to the 
white man, and the colour bar which 
was then set up has remained until the 
present day, and is likely to remain for 
a long period to come ... There is one 
more point ... the fact that we find, 
due to this colour bar, and due to 
general prejudice, that the Native is put 
in a separate location. He is "put 
away" from the white people. He is not 
allowed to share in their cultural 
amenities . . . This sort of thing does 
not occur in other countries". 
The concern underlying this statement 
was not however the emancipation of 
the black citizen - it was to provide a 
backdrop for the contention that town 
planning was, in technical, organiza­
tional and physical senses, a feasible 
means of addressing and perhaps 
solving racial societal problems. Com­
menting on Kantorowich 's and other 
papers, Glyn Thomas (1938:380) took 
the Platonic path in saying that a great 
deal will have been done if the papers 
lent impetus amongst the mass to a 
desire for a better life. 
PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION 
Six years later - on 19th January 1944, 
to be exact - a founding meeting of the 
South African Branch of the Town 
Planning Institute of Great Britain 
took place in the Johannesburg City 
Hall. Among those present were Me­
ssrs Floyd, Backhouse and McManus. 
Out of this Branch arose the South 
African Institute of Town and Re­
gional Planners. On 15th February 
1954 in Professor Fassler's office at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, the 
formative meeting of our present Insti­
tute was held - with T B Floyd in the 
chair and, inter alia, Messrs Scott, 
Anderson, Marsh and Professor Fass­
ler present. With this, the stamp of 
professionalism and all the responsibil­
ities that go with that accolade, was 
imprinted on the work of the planner. 
The fledgling institute set about its task 
with an enthusiasm manifest in the 
organisation of a Summer School in 
1959. Three main areas of concentra­
tion are evident in the programme of 
the School: the legislative machinery 
for planning, analytical approaches to 
land uses and reviews of South Africa's 
new towns. Preoccupation with the 
technicalities of planning, with a clear 
concern with the sections and sub­
sections of town planning schemes, of 
density calculations and systems of 
notation for town planning maps, is 
everywhere evident in the proceedings. 
The trappings of technicalities appear 
to have reduced at least two funda­
mental issues to no more than passing 
reference. Monte Rosenberg touched 
on one of these in referring to town 
planning legislative control, and in 
saying " ... I think perhaps control is 
the word at which we diverge. I think 
that we must accept that it is manifest 
that planning can only be effective and 
can only achieve anything just so long 
as the planners work with the consent 
of the planned. I know that this is 
perhaps a bit of a truism but you can 
achieve no more with your planning 
than the political or social climate of 
the community in which you plan, will 
permit" (Rosenberg 1959:38). This 
small first step in the direction of 
social/ participatory planning was re­
jected as "poppycock" by one partici­
pant and was accorded little attention 
thereafter. The second issue over­
looked at the Summer School was 
touched upon by Bouchier ( 1959:28) in 
his paper on the Town Planning Laws 
of the provinces: "attention might next 
be drawn to Acts such as the Slums 
Act, the Housing Act, the Group 
Areas Act, the Group Areas Develop­
ment Act and the Natives Urban Areas 
Act. These Acts- all affect planning to a 
greater or lesser extent". Indeed they 
do, but seemingly not sufficiently in 
the late l 950's to warrant head-scrat­
ching or heartsearching, for no debate 
on the impact of these enactments on 
planning for the Black sector of society 
was pursued. 
This void was filled - partially at least 
- at the Jnstitute's next conference held
in Johannesburg in 1962. Discussing
planning at central government level,
the author of one paper explained how
planning for the black population was
undertaken by various government
bodies. The first of these was the Bantu
Areas Section, the importance of
which, " ... cannot be overstressed.
The country has to endure a great deal
of criticism of its policies, and the
development of the Bantu Areas can-
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not be allowed to fail through lack of 
proper planning. Only the very best of 
our planners should be employed in 
this work". Does this mark the com­
mencement of co-option of the plan­
ning fraternity by the Nationalist 
Government? Does it denote the sub­
stitution of a planning ethos by the 
doctrine of apartheid? A partial ans­
wer is provided: "The Group Areas 
Board itself by its racial zoning per­
forms a vital planning function in 
South Africa ... It is thus gratifying to 
note that an eminent town planner was 
recently appointed to the Board, and it 
is to be hoped that he will be able to 
influence the Board to demand compe­
tent ,town planning advice before far­
reaching decisions are taken" (Rei­
necke 1962:15/ 16). The import of this 
statement on the purpose and motives 
of planning in South Africa is ob­
viously profound. 
Beyond discussion on the planning 
function at various levels of govern­
ment, the 1962 conference focussed on 
the requirements of planning educa­
tion (which was to lead to the intro­
duction of the country's first full-time 
undergraduate course at the University 
of Witwatersrand in 1965). 
The general tone of the planning 
profession at this time can be charac­
terized as prescriptive: a prescribing of 
functions, forms and levels of planning 
within a prescribed - and unquesti­
oned - political framework, with little 
reference to social purpose or human 
justice. The approach cannot in conse­
quence be called normative, a term 
which generally carries with it moral 
connotations of equity and fairness. 
The prescriptive attitude is perhaps 
most evident in Floyd's book on Town 
Planning in South Africa, published in 
1960. The work is described on the 
flyleaf as a clear exposition of the 
fundamentals of sound town planning 
and their adaptation to many features 
peculiar to South Africa. One such 
feature is Floyd's interpretation of the 
prevailing requirement that applicants 
for township approval provide land for 
"Bantu workers"; an erf in a residential 
township requiring provision for "one 
site in a location". Floyd goes on to say 
that "this means that only the Bantu 
worker is provided for by this require­
ment. It places the Bantu group in the 
position of a privileged group" (Floyd, 
1960:75). 
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In his later published work, Floyd has 
difficulty in accepting international 
definitions of planning that embody 
notions of social harmony, and ap­
plauds the "newer conception of town 
planning as an administrative function 
and as a coordinating discipline em­
bracing an organizing principle 
(which) is at last a full conception of 
town planning ... This is logically 
what an administrative function such 
as town planning, in which technical 
methods and design are employed for 
administrative ends, should be" (Floyd 
1966:20). 
ERA OF INDIFFERENCE 
The Institute entered the decade of the 
l 970's with a conference in Johannes­
burg on education, the objective of 
which was to consider the current 
trends and directions in planning 
education and in the planning profes­
sion. On rereading the papers and 
discussion making up the proceedings, 
one cannot but be struck by the atten­
tion paid the increasing involvement of 
government planning. 
"The continued growth of the four 
major urban communities and their 
attraction for the rural migrant led to 
the adoption by the Government of a 
Border Industry Policy, and found 
expression in the Physical Planning 
and Resources Development Act (No 
88 of 1967) which allowed central 
Government to control the location of 
industrial development, the zoning and 
planning of industrial land and the 
employment of Africans in industry in 
proclaimed areas. From the Physical 
Planning point of view, this legislation 
established the principal that certain 
aspects of development control are a 
function of the Central Government" 
(Louw 1972: 19). This growing govern­
mental involvement was also prevalent 
at the local level: "It can be seen .... 
that the system which is the city is 
controlled not only by its own locally 
elected body but also by the Province 
and the Central Government . . . the 
Province not only interferes in the 
planning and control functions of local 
authorities but very largely does away 
with the two-way communication be­
tween planners and the community"' 
(Reinecke 1972: 121 ). 
The conference exposed the generally 
limited extent of concern of the profes-
sion about state policy at that time. 
The tacit acceptance of increasing 
government coercion and control, the 
turning of a blind eye to the social 
consequences attaching to apartheid 
legislation, the indifference to the 
plight of the black majority, is inexpli­
cable today but was seemingly ac­
cepted as admissible then. 
Two years later, the same socio-poli­
tical indifference surfaced at a metro­
politan planning conference in Dur­
ban. The papers were, by and large, 
analytical in approach and politically 
acquiescent in tone. This is exemplified 
by a presentation on racial statification 
in South African urban society, which 
includes the comment: "We are not 
concerned here with the relative merits 
or demerits of such a system (apart­
heid) but only with its functional 
impact upon society and social space" 
(Davies 1974:39). The planning frater­
nity seemingly slipped once again into 
the security of silence, the comfort of 
compliance. Two voices did however 
scratch at the complacency of the 
conference: those of Tony Barac and 
Sir Colin Buchanan. Barac (1974: 114) 
suggested that planners "give our 
legislators good and reasoned advice 
on why our laws are bad ... We 
abrogate responsibility at our peril". 
Buchanan (1974:249) spoke of the 
system of allocation of land for specific 
racial groups, and said that "as I 
looked at some of the plans displayed 
round this hall and I saw the plaiting 
and weaving of the racial areas that 
seems to be involved I could not help 
thinking to myself what an appalling 
complication for metropolitan plan­
ning is involved ... the complexity you 
planners face here in South Africa 
from this rigid grouping of racial zones 
is something I had not reckoned with". 
Nor had the planners and people of the 
Republic reckoned with June 16, 1976 
and its aftermath. Reactions to the 
conflagration and to the rejection by 
black South Africans of the prevailing 
political order were of course highly 
varied, but the response of the profes­
sion, while not profound, was to be 
tinged with a new touch of �penness, 
of critical enquiry, of conscience. 
ERA OF AMBIGUITY 
The breezes of liberalism that wafted 
through the planning fraternity at that 
time, were felt in the planning and 
development conference of the Insti­
tute in Stellenbosch in 1977. Pre­
viously unheard voices such as those of 
Sam Matsuenyane, Justice Tshungu, 
David Thebahali, Dev Rajah, Bishop 
Alpheus Zulu and Minister Mbabama 
of Transkei introduced new perspec­
tives, new interpretations of problems 
and perhaps a new feeling of discom­
fort to the profession. There was in this 
a climate of challenge, in many ways 
typified by the comments of Nico 
Stutterheim in his keynote address 
(1977:10/15) "For welfare to be ach­
ieved there must be peace and har-
. mony within the country . . . This is 
becoming difficult in the world of 
today if South Africa does not pro­
gressively abrogate statutory discrimi­
nation based on colour ... Sharing of 
power, now vested largely in White 
hands, with Coloureds, Indians and 
Blacks is necessary . . . There is not 
much time left for the communities of 
Southern Africa to plan boldly to 
ensure survival in a way acceptable to 
them. Have we the will and the fore­
sight to do it? Are we prepared to play 
on both the black and white squares of 
our chess game ... ". Challenges for 
change that could have, should have, 
had a lasting impact on the conceptual 
and practical bases of the profession. 
Some discerned a possible change in 
the role of the planner - which Lamont 
expressed in this way in a 1979 publi­
cation of the Transvaal Branch: "The 
basis of this (role) change is rooted in 
the shift in emphasis of/ the planning 
object. The accent is moving from 
richer to poorer; from White to Black 
and Brown; from capi�alistically-ori­
ented to socialistically ;oriented". In 
reviewing the backgr9und to this 
change, he went on to say that there 
was a " ... gradual realisation that 
South Africa's pluralism had to be 
recognized in planning considerations 
... planners' ethical consideration kept 
them in constant tension with the 
greed of the capitalistically-oriented 
customer and a form of resistance 
against neglected planning ethics deve­
loped gradually". This must constitute 
one of the early definitive references to 
planning ethics, and is indirectly 
touched upon in the statement that 
" ... we have gaps in our planning 
system in South Africa, for instance 
the National Physical 'Development 
Plan does not even include the Black 
States, which is unbelievable" (Lamont 
1979:40/41/46). There is in this, a 
nuance of the Aristotlean ethic - of the 
golden mean - of a moderating of the 
long sustained attitude of unquestion­
ing acceptance of the ideology of the 
State. 
The humanisation of the discipline 
proceeded into the 1980's with a "Plan­
ning for People" conference in Preto­
ria. The issue of participation in plan­
ning was well ventilated and, although 
the impetus of the Stellenbosch confer­
ence had waned, a range of viewpoints 
was presented. The proposal that true 
participation be extended to the disad­
vantaged black majority; that planning 
be "Promotive in the sense of provid­
ing guiding frameworks within which 
the affected people can exercise their 
right to self-interest and self-expres­
sion; their right to exercise choice and 
express preference, to make decisions 
and make mistakes, to explore and 
experiment, to plan a productive part 
in the development of their living 
environment" (Muller 1980: 10) met 
with a mixed reception - possibly 
indicative of the attitudinal ambiguity 
running through the profession at that 
time. The difference, perhaps even 
dichotomy, in planning approach in 
the country then is placed in focus in 
an article on guide plans by the Chief 
Planner of the Department of Plan­
ning and Environment. In contradic­
tion to the participatory concerns of 
the Institute, this article says ( of the 
British system)" ... that public partici­
pation has reached a stage of such 
over-democratisation that planning 
has been bogged down by objections 
from the public, and only a few plans 
have reached finality" (van Tonder 
1978: 13). This standpoint was echoed 
by a planning practitioner in a publica­
tion of March 1979: the guide plan" ... 
avoids unwieldy public participation -
a problem that has been experienced in 
Britain and which has become a plan­
ner's headache. Excessive public par­
ticipation can often mean unnecessary 
delays, legal problems and considera­
ble expense" (Jaspan 1979: 10). 
These comments are illustrative of an 
attitude of rejection of participatory 
planning and coincidentally, of the 
acceptance of the discriminatory guide 
plan procedure and its underlying 
separatist ideology. The latter paper 
states that " ... this article does not 
question the philosophical or theoreti­
cal base of the guide plan concept ... 
It stems from the reality that guide 
plans are part of our statutes and are 
hence a fait accompli". (Jaspan 
1979:9). The reversion to acquiescence 
of earlier years is evident as is the 
disparity in moral position between the 
liberal and reactionary camps of the 
profession. The guide plan procedure 
with its covert racial proclivities and 
purposes stands as a major moral and 
procedural blemish in the chronicle of 
South African planning. 
THE PRESENT 
The themes of the most recent gather­
ings of the Institute, in Durban and 
Bophuthatswana, reflect a tendency to 
return to the safe haven of technical, 
asocial and apolitical planning. The 
one, dealing with the non-contentious 
matter of retailing, and the other with 
the administrative structure of regional 
services councils, are illustrative of 
this. 
The current question must therefore 
revolve about views as to where the 
profession stands at this crucial time 
and how it is preparing to move into 
the uncertain but exciting future in this 
land. That the years ahead will be 
different to anything here-before is 
surely common cause, and that the 
responsibilities and role of the planner 
must in consequence undergo change 
appears similarly evident. At the heart 
of this is the fact that change must 
invoke ethical considerations, so that 
the profession can advance into new 
areas supported by legitimate and 
defensible moral convictions. 
THE FUTURE 
It is difficult to discern any particular 
ethical stance adopted by the planning 
profession over the last seven decades, 
particularly in relation to the racial 
problerp. At best, the profession can be 
said to· have turned a blind eye to the 
plight of the majority of the popula­
tion of this country, and to have 
remained silent when voices should 
and could have been raised. At worst, 
the planning fraternity can be accused 
of contributing to the maintenance of a 
repressive, unjust and indefensible 
system. The consequences of apartheid 
- which still permeate all corners of the
land - on the black citizens of South
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Africa must be acknowledged. It has 
deprived the majority of the popula­
tion of the Republic of access to land 
and property; it has curtailed freedom 
of movement and settlement; it has 
compromised educational opportuni­
ties and standards; it has split families 
and forced those who are not white to 
live in degraded conditions. It has 
forced black citizens into situations of 
inferiority in all areas of activity. 
Planning has played a role in more of 
this than one would wish to acknow­
ledge. 
Like other professions in this country, 
planning will have to come to terms 
with its own past. There is no solace in 
saying that planning activities simply 
reflected the society in which it exe­
cuted its work. There is no excuse for a 
purportedly socially sensitive discipline 
to offer support to a harsh inhuman 
order. 
The demise of apartheid will however 
set planning free to meet its potential 
as an instrument of justice, choice and 
security for all. The profession should, 
like the Royal Town Planning Institute 
now place on record its eschewal of 
racial bigotry. Clause 5 of the R TPI
code of conduct states that "in all their 
professional activities, members shall 
seek to eliminate discrimination on the 
grounds, of race, sex, creed and reli­
gion and in particular shall seek to 
promote equality of opportunity be-
24 
tween people of different racial groups 
and good race relations". The profes­
sion should also, like the American 
Institute of Certified Planners, commit 
itself to the promotion of the interests 
of the disadvantaged sector of society, 
because without such commitment the 
imbalance in emphasis in the planners 
work will not be redressed. The second 
canon of the AICP code of practice 
states that "a planner must strive to 
expand choice and opportunity for all 
persons, recognizing a special responsi­
bility to plan for the needs of disadvan­
taged groups and persons and must 
urge the alteration of policies, institu­
tions and decisions which oppose such 
needs". The profession must place its 
preoccupation with social regulation 
behind it and think about 'ways that 
planning can promote freedom of 
opportunity and equity in choice. We 
should acknowledge that the only 
feasible strategy for the future is one 
that offers gains to society in general 
while providing for substantial impro­
vement of the lot of the disadvantaged 
majority. 
Inasmuch as these propositions are in 
the end directed at the concept of 
justice in a democratic society, it seems 
apparent that, ethically, the planning 
profession could well embrace the 
Rawlsian theory of justice which pos­
tulates equal right to equal liberties 
and greater benefits to the least advan-
taged. The profession might find moral 
merit in the utilitarian ethic of happi­
ness for the greatest number or the 
Kantian philosophy of ethical impar­
tiality that calls for an attitude of 
moral reciprocity. Sartre's injunction 
that we have sufficient respect for the 
freedom of others that they are able to 
live their lives as they choose, provides 
the basis of another ethical model. It is 
now the responsibility of the profes­
sional institute and its members to 
develop an ethical approach congruent 
with the needs of·a democratic society, 
and it is the task of the planning 
educationists to start the process of 
moral readjustment in their teaching 
programmes so that a new and legiti­
mate ethical culture will progressively 
pervade the discipline. 
In this article of many quotations, I 
conclude with another - drawn from 
that renowned Englishman, William 
Morris. He saw, as a moral obligation, 
the need to turn his land "from the 
grimy backyard of a workshop into a 
garden. If that seems difficult".he said 
"I cannot help it. I only know that it is 
necessary" (In Creese 1964:295). If the 
mission or prospect of taking on a new 
and socially tenable ethical position 
appears difficult or uninviting to the 
planning profession in this country at 
this time, I cannot help it. I only know 
that it is necessary. 
NOTE 
1 This article is based on the paper 
"The Future of Planning: the Ethi­
cal Dimension" presented at the 
Biennial National Conference of the 
South African Institute of Town 
and Regional Planners, held in 
Bloemfontein in October 1990. 
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